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Abstract: Most studies of FOSS organizational migration projects focus 
solely on technological and economical aspects, neglecting the importance 
of organizational discourse structures for migration decisions as well as 
success. In looking at the case of the municipality of Munich this paper uses 
structuration theory in combination with discourse analysis to explain why 
and how in this case actors were able to overcome strong barriers to migra-
tion in the field of desktop software. 
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1 Introduction 
Of all recent examples of organizations switching their software environment 
to Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) the municipality of Munich in Germany re-
ceived significant attention, at least in the media. The reasons for this are the fol-
lowing:  
• Munich decided to migrate the whole desktop software environment including 
operating system and office suite to FOSS – not only server software or office 
suits as had done many organizations before.  
• With approximately 14.000 desktops the municipality in Munich is by far lar-
ger than other municipal predecessors such as for example Schwäbisch-Hall 
with about 225 desktop PCs [19].  
• Only few weeks before the migration decision in May 2003 Microsoft’s CEO 
Steven Ballmer met with Munich’s mayor Ude to convince him not to do so 
and failed. 
But aside these aspects the migration decision and process in Munich is also a 
critical case [34] for studying why and how organizations take the lead in adopting 
a minority system in markets with strong network effects, often referred to as 
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“path dependent” [6, 3]1. Whereas many studies of FOSS adoption, especially in 
the domain of information systems, focus on technical implementation and migra-
tion issues (e.g. [22]) and do not distinguish between desktop and server usage 
(e.g. [1]), the organizational processes associated with these migrations are often 
overlooked or underrated. 
In combining structuration theory [12, 20, 21, 24] with concepts of discourse 
analysis [14, 4, 5] this paper tries to conceptualize why and how organizations 
take the lead in escaping Microsoft’s desktop software path.  
2 FOSS adoption as a case of path breaking 
1.1 Path dependency in software markets 
Following Shapiro and Varian [23] as well as Varian et al. [29] there are sev-
eral mechanisms in software markets such as network effects, investment and 
learning spirals or complementarity (see Table 2.1) that differentiate them from 
“classic markets”. All these mechanisms are recursively self-reinforcing and thus 
increase switching costs of individual adopters over time, making a migration to 
FOSS an expensive and laborious task. Following David’s [6, 7] notion of path 
dependency, Microsoft’s monopoly position in the market for desktop operating 
systems and office suites doesn’t prevail because of the superiority of its products 
but because of their customer’s lock-in on them. 
Table 2.1: Selection of mechanisms leading to swiching costs in desktop software markets  
Mechanism Example 
Direct and indirect network effects 
The larger the installed base of a piece of software, the 
greater the benefits (also for the individual actor) of adopting 
it. [10] 
Investment and learning spirals 
Investments into a specific piece of software lead to even 
more investements into the same, creating a growing stock of 
idiosyncratic assets. [33] 
Complementarity 
Two (or more) in principle autonomous mechanisms – e.g. 
software diversity and organizational decentralization – rein-
force one another. [26] 
However, the logic that leads to path dependency of (in particular: organiza-
tional) actors in software markets results from mutual and recursive interdepend-
                                                          
1 Shapiro and Varian [23] even call the market for desktop software „everyone’s favourite 
example” for concepts like “lock-in” or “increasing returns”. 
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encies between technological and social structures. Orlikowski [20, 21] calls this 
the “duality of technology”: 
The duality of technology identifies prior views of technology – as either objective force 
or as socially constructed product – as a false dichotomy. Technology is the product of 
human action, while it also assumes structural properties. That is, technology is physically 
constructed by actors working in a given social context, and technology is socially 
constructed by actors through the different meanings they attach to it and the various 
features they emphasize and use. [20:496] 
In an organizational context the mechanisms described in Table 1 do not effect 
software adoption directly but are mediated through intra-organizational dynamics 
and structures. Stones’ [24] “quadripartite” notion of structuration [12] was origi-
nally developed for the individual actor but seems to be applicable on the organ-
izational level, as well (see Figure 2.1). The main point of structuration theory is 
to acknowledge the “duality at work in which agents and structures are not kept 
apart but in which they are mutually constitutive of one another” [24:21]. 
 
Fig. 2.1: Structuration model of technology adoption 
1.2 Path breaking FOSS? 
The reasons why there is still competition in the market for desktop PC operat-
ing systems lie in the idiosyncratic characteristics of recently developed FOSS al-
ternatives such as GNU/Linux which differ in development process [31], license 
fees, access to source code, and strong competition among several suppliers in a 
way that is impossible to imitate for Microsoft if it wants to prolong its business 
model.2 Nevertheless, the barriers to migration especially in the market for desk-
top operating systems – contrary to the server market – still seem to prevent Mi-
crosoft from serious competition in this field [13]. Especially large organizations 
hesitate to switch their desktop software environment to alternatives provided by 
open source software competitors ([32], see Table 2.2), and still little is known 
why and how they do so. 
                                                          
2 For an overview of the differences between Free/Open Source and proprietary software, see 
the anthology by [11]. 
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Table 2.2 FOSS desktop usage in organizations in three countries (taken from Wichmann [32]) 
Size* UK Sweden Germany 
Small 7,6% 3,4% 13,7% 
Large 2,0% 3,2% 6,5% 
* < 500 employees = small; > 500 employees = large 
What we do know, however, is that technological and economic reasons may 
not play a decisive role in the question whether to adopt FOSS or stay on the Mi-
crosoft path, as Varian and Shapiro ([30:12]; italics by L.D.) summarize their re-
view of TCO comparisons in the literature:  
There have been several attempts to compare the TCO of Windows and of Linux in 
various computing environments. In most of the studies the difference in TCO is on the 
order of 10 or 15 percent. This difference is not large; a 10 percent difference in TCO 
could easily be swamped by local conditions, random events, and other considerations. To 
a first approximation, it seems reasonable to suppose that neither of these two platforms 
has a striking advantage over the other in terms of conventional measures of TCO. 
So the question remains why and how do organizations then decide to migrate 
their desktop software environment to FOSS alternatives in spite of strong net-
work effects? This paper suggests taking a look at the organizational migration 
discourse. 
3 Method Section 
3.1 Data collection 
Following Yin [34:8], the unique strength of a case study is “its ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence”, including documents, artifacts, interviews, and 
observations. To live up to this potential and for triangulation reasons, over a two 
year period from 2006 to 2007 data was collected in form of open-ended inter-
views with actors on different organisational levels, transcripts of talks given at 
practitioner conferences, archival documents including the “Client Study” of 
Unilog Integrata (consulting firm, [28]) and media coverage. All data was inte-
grated into a case study database (see Table 3.1) but only transcripts were included 
in the discourse analysis. 
Table 3.1: Case Study database 
transcripts  
interviews / persons 7 / 7 
talks / persons 3 / 3 
5 
Σ transcripts / persons 10 / 9 
per functional area (transcripts / persons):  
political administration 2 / 2 
central IT 5 / 3 
decentral IT 2 / 2 
external* 2 / 2 
media coverage (2001-2007)**  
articles (online / print) 68 / 34 
archival documents  
sets of slides 11 
agenda papers 31 
miscellaneous 7 
* „external“ includes service provider and consultants  
** articles from the following sources from 2002-2007 : 
Heise.de, Computerwoche, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 
3.2 Discourse analysis 
In adopting the cyclical ideal of qualitative research [25], the data analysis was 
divided into three parts that were not undertaken in strict consecutiveness: Induc-
tive generation of theoretical categories of both mechanisms enforcing and weak-
ening path dependency is complemented with chronological process descriptions. 
These two parts are connected in a final theoretical integration, using archival 
documents and media coverage to cross-check interview data and for the right 
temporal ordering.  
For categorization, the literally transcribed interviews and talks were reduced to 
692 paraphrases as the basis for coding the data. Then, in multiple, consecutive 
rounds a system of coding categories was developed with focus on the meta-
category “barriers and drivers for the adoption of an alternative (i.e. non-
Microsoft) desktop operating system” [16, 18]. These inductively generated cate-
gories were then classified as predominantly covering “Framing” or “Program” 
aspects of the migration discourse – a dichotomy taken from Campbell’s [4, 5:94] 
typology of ideas, which differentiates between the two as follows:  
• Programs are “ideas as elite prescriptions that enable […] the charting of a 
clear and specific course of action” 
• Frames are “ideas as symbols and concepts that enable decision makers to le-
gitimise programs to their constituents”. 
In integrating these categories in an organizational structuration model as it is 
presented in Figure 3.1, the translation of discourse into organizational technology 
adoption can be conceptualized.  
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Fig. 3.1: Organizational discourse structures 
4 Munich’s migration process and discourse 
The following description of the FOSS migration process in Munich is a radi-
cally condensed version of a much more detailed narration provided in [8]. 
4.1 The process: emergence of radical change 
One core concept of path dependency theory in a narrow sense3 is that of 
“small events”: A series of small, partially unrelated or even stochastic events sets 
in motion a self-reinforcing process that eventually leads from a contingent state at 
the beginning to a state of ex-ante unpredictable lock-in [7, 26,].The case of Mu-
nich demonstrates that small events can also play a decisive role in the early stages 
of a path breaking process. 
The politician – a private user of the proprietary “Ami Pro” – who set the ball 
rolling by suggesting the search for alternatives to Microsoft (MS) Office was 
only a backbencher (“Hinterbänkler”) in the city council, which he left soon after 
his motion. The first reaction of the IT officials was an attempt to turn the whole 
                                                          
3 “Narrow” is meant in the tradition of David [6] and Arthur [3] and compared to scholars us-
ing “path” and “path dependency” only as a metaphor for the truism that “history matters”. For 
an extensive discussion, see Dobusch and Schüßler [9]. 
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issue done by a simple product comparison between MS Office and several alter-
natives (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Product comparison prepared by the central IT department for the responsible council 
committee's meeting in Nov. 2001 
Advantages Disadvantages 
StarOffice is Open Source Software 
Lower purchase costs 
End of dependence on Microsoft 
Cross platform applicability (StarOf-
fice) 
Re-working in existing documents necessary because of 
- partial lack of import/export 
- different macro languages 
- different object models  
New product line needs requires more training and, there-
fore, leads to higher training costs  
There is no in-house training personnel  
Insufficent online-help (StarOffice) 
StarOffice/SmartSuite data formats are mostly not suit-
able for data exchange. Documents would have to be 
handed on in MS Office or RTF format. 
The already deployed – and paid for – MS Office prod-
ucts would have to be replaced all over although they are 
often not even amortised (to ensure readability in internal 
data exchange) 
No mail-client (SmartSuite) 
Dissatisfied with their IT official’s analysis, the political members of the com-
mittee demanded a second, more in-depth evaluation with special focus on eco-
nomic efficiency, also taking into consideration the desktop operating system, as 
Microsoft had already cancelled its support for the Windows version in use. The 
following expert’s advice [28] then convinced the IT staff of the viability of a 
FOSS solution. When this result was presented to the council committee, the situa-
tion surprisingly was the opposite way round compared to autumn 2001, as one of 
the officials describes:  
“When, for the first time, we proposed Linux on the basis of the external study in autumn 
2002 in the IT committee […] we got a lot of stick ((laughs)) […] and I thought we don’t 
even need to continue, we slunk off with our tails between our legs.“ 
At the same time, the results of the “Client Study” and its recommendation to 
migrate alerted Microsoft – up to the CEO level: In April 2003, Microsoft CEO 
Steven Ballmer interrupted his holidays in Switzerland to visit Munich’s mayor. 
But, again, an attempt to turn down the migration plan even strengthened the mo-
mentum behind it: The amount of media coverage skyrocketed, thus increasing 
pressure on politicians to resist to the monopolist’s power. As another conse-
quence of the increased public interest, many firms and other municipalities en-
couraged Munich’s officials and politicians to stay on their way and offered 
knowledge exchange. Additionally, Microsoft’s move also motivated its competi-
tors IBM and NovellSuse to upgrade their offers of assistance during a potential 
migration process. In May 2003, after weeks of heated seesaw changes in the cal-
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culation of the different alternatives, the council made the principle decision in fa-
vour of a migration to FOSS and authorised its IT department to work out a de-
tailed draft for the project. 
Consciousness of the actual costs, complexity and efforts connected with this 
decision only rose incrementally along the following migration process. What had 
started as a search for an alternative office software suite in 2001 had ended as a 
complete restructuring of the municipality’s IT organization and processes:  
• After the migration, only one standardized and centrally developed operating 
system version replaced the several different Windows versions. 
• As a consequence of the standardized client, many prior decentralised tasks and 
routines (e.g. operating system set up4, administration and configuration) were 
going to be fulfilled by a central client team.  
• In introducing a new standardized tool to manage office forms and master 
documents called “Wollmux”5, the city’s corporate design guidelines were to 
be reinforced and – for the first time in history – to be implemented uniformly 
in the whole municipality. 
• The change of the operating system gave reason for a general consolidation of 
the municipality’s diverse software landscape, reducing the variety of applica-
tions in use. 
Summing up this short description, there are at least three remarkable aspects 
of Munich’s odyssey from Windows to FOSS (see also Figure 4.1): First, technol-
ogy adoption and organisational change – especially concerning different degrees 
of organisational (de)centrality – are deeply intertwined and reciprocally enforc-
ing. Second, roles and preferences of individual actors change during the process, 
converting some of them from opponents into proponents and vice-versa. It is, 
therefore, impossible – or at least, misleading – to simply reduce individual atti-
tudes towards the adoption of Free and Open Source Software to their job func-
tions as it is tried by Alexy and Henkel [1], and underlines the importance of ap-
plying a process perspective in researching adoption decisions. Third, external 
advice and interventions play an important catalytic role in the process, but at the 
same time are only “perturbations” [17] of overall internal organizational dynam-
ics.  
                                                          
4 Although all departments had adopted the same operating system (Windows NT), its set up 
in terms of administration tools, settings, and support software varied.  
5 „Wollmux“ is a neologism combining the German „eierlegende Wollmilchsau“ (colloquial 
for “all-in-one device suitable for every purpose”) and the name of the Linux mascot “Tux”. 
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Fig. 4.1: Recursive re-production of organizational software paths and respective interventions. 
4.2 The discourse: coalitions of actors and issues 
Table 4.2 depicts relative frequencies of dominant issues raised by actors in dif-
ferent organizational subsystems – political administration, central and decentral 
IT departments – on the basis of inductively generated coding categories [18]. It 
distinguishes thereby between legitimizing frames and programs charting a spe-
cific course of action [4, 5] both of which were – depending on the respective con-
text – predominantly coded as either pro- or anti-migration6. 
In Munich, two different organizational camps applied different frames to le-
gitimize the same FOSS migration project and thus build what Hajer [14] calls a 
“discourse coalition”. On the one hand, politicians stressed frames referring to a 
diffuse “anti-monopoly” ideology and the particular responsibility as a public ad-
ministration. The central IT officials, on the other hand, framed the introduction of 
FOSS above all as the (looked-for) opportunity to re-centralize the municipality’s 
organizational IT structure; for them – as the only subgroup – switching gains ex-
ceed switching efforts. Together, these two camps generate enough momentum 
[15] to overcome the strong innovation barriers of the desktop software markets. 
Together, these two camps generate enough momentum to overcome the strong 
                                                          
6 Except for some unidimensional coding categories, most categories aggregate two antithetic 
codes that cover statements referring either to barriers and downsides or drivers and advantages 
of a migration to FOSS. A category was classified as “predominantly pro- or anti-migration” if 
there was a difference larger than unity between the two. 
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barriers to FOSS introduction that materialized also in resistance in decentralized 
IT departments. Those opposed the migration as their expert’s knowledge – gained 
over years of “learning by doing” [2] – depreciated rapidly under a new operating 
system because of the „creative destruction“ of skills and knowledge in every 
technological innovation process [27]. 
Table 4.2: Dominant Frames and Programs in Munich’s Migration Discourse 
 Frames 
(Top 3 out of 15 categories with a total of 
439 codings) 
Programs 





18,68 % anti-monopoly(***) 
17,58 % (overall) profitability 
14,29 % public administration issues 
27,14 % discussions 
15,71 % external advice 
12,86 % migration complexity(*) 
Central IT 
department 
25,98 % switching gains & efforts 
18,63 % organisational structures(*) 
15,20 % (overall) profitability 
27,52 % migration strategy 
24,03 % applications (incl. macros)(**) 




26,39 % organisational structures(*) 
22,92 % switching gains & efforts(*) 
14,58 % expectations & uncertainty 
17,09 % organisational know-how(*) 
16,46 % migration strategy 
15,19 % migration complexity(*) 
(*) predominantly coded anti-migration 
(**) unidimensional anti-migration code 
(***) unidimensional pro-migration code  
Looking at the categories that predominantly cover program aspects in the mi-
gration discourse (see right column in Table 4.2) one can see several facets more 
clearly: First, migration to FOSS is hard work and requires a lot of effort, in par-
ticular in cases of large-scale, rather complete migration projects like the one in 
Munich: Especially in both IT-departments categories that are predominantly 
coded anti-migration prevail and reflect the efforts necessary to migrate hundreds 
of special purpose applications and thousands of macros, forms and templates. 
Second, the program categories mirror the interventions depicted in Figure 4.1 and 
hence give an impression of the great variety of tasks necessary in such a migra-
tion project. Third, the again anti-migration position of the officials in the decen-
tralized IT departments corresponds with the fact that they have to carry most of 
the migration burdens. Many of the migration tasks such as for example altering 
macros or forms means work, which at least in parts is additional to day-to-day 
routines. 
Compared to other prominent and large-scale FOSS migration examples like 
the French car manufacturer PSA Peugeot7 or police forces in France and Nieder-
sachsen/Germany8, Munich’s migration enterprise is illuminative for at least two 
reasons: First, migration complexity and efforts seem to grow disproportionately if 
not only significant parts as in the case of PSA Peugeot but the complete software 
                                                          
7 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6674/469, accessed 27 February 2008.  
8 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/7343/528, accessed 27 February 2008 and 
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/40374/ accessed 14 December 2008. 
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environment is to be changed in a rather short period of time. Second, migration 
complexity and efforts seem to grow disproportionately with functional and hence 
software diversity in an organization. As Opposed to police force cases in France 
and Germany where only few special purpose applications have to be migrated 
and the functional diversity is relatively low, in large municipal administrations 
the situation is the other way round. This in turn led at least in Munich to the need 
for organizational restructuring which complicated the migration process and vice-
versa. 
5 Conclusions 
Not only because of a municipality being a (at least: partially) political organi-
zation, the decision to (not) adopt FOSS in organizational contexts is always a po-
litical one: In organizations there will be winners and losers of migration proc-
esses as switching one’s desktop software environment affects (complementary) 
organizational variables such as degree of decentralization or individual and or-
ganizational know-how. As a consequence, future research of FOSS adoption 
processes should include both looking at the (changes in the) migration discourse 
and at its organizational contextualisation. This study can only be a first step into 
this direction. 
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